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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Leaffer, a doyen of copyright law and well-known
and prolific copyright scholar, has provided a masterly review of
recent copyright decisions by the Supreme Court. It should not be
surprising that I find much with which to agree in what he says.
That said, there are a few points—and I will assert professorial
privilege here—that I would add, and some that I view rather
differently than he does.
As Professor Leaffer points out, it is challenging to find a
unifying theme in the Court’s recent copyright cases or indeed in
its recent intellectual property cases more generally. I think
Professor Leaffer and I agree that the closest thing to an
1
underlying theme in the cases we are here discussing—Eldred,
2
3
Tasini, and Dastar —is the Court’s remarkable deference to

†
Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
1. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 235 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919. 967 (1983) (White, J. dissenting)).
2. New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
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Congress. But perhaps unlike Professor Leaffer, I think it
exceedingly odd that while in other areas this Court has not
hesitated to rein in Congress’s power (particularly its Commerce
4
Clause power), it seems to treat the limits on Congress’s power
with regard to copyright as largely theoretical.
Now, this is not a “theme” in the sense that legal scholars often
use the term. I think that no coherent vision of copyright is
reflected in these cases, and the majority opinions seem to rest
mostly on a foundation of extreme caution. Nevertheless, I think
we can examine the decisions and discern the direction in which
they point. Professor Leaffer and I might disagree on that
direction, but perhaps that reflects mainly my inherent pessimism
and his relative optimism.
I am concerned that the Court’s deference is becoming an
5
“invincible repose on the status quo.” In copyright law, such
deference means that the bargain among the content industries
enacted as the Copyright Act of 1976 will be left untouched.
Whether this is appropriate depends, of course, on the bargain. But
once one realizes that the bargain encodes critical assumptions
about the nature of copyright and copyrighted works, and that
those assumptions are rapidly being washed away by the digital tide,
merely maintaining the status quo is not only insufficient but
sometimes impossible. In other words, the Constitution requires
the Court, and in fact all of us, to reappraise the application of
theory and doctrine to the world we actually live in. This is
6
something the Court has often done —but not in recent copyright
7
cases.
What are these critical assumptions? Let me attempt to answer
this question before I delve further into the mystery of the Court’s
copyright direction.

3. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 123 S. Ct.
2041 (2003).
4. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
5. Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 530 (1920) (Holmes, J.).
6. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
7. In the past the Court has recognized the need to adapt traditional
copyright concepts to changing technology. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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II. THE NATURE OF AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Content Industry Bargaining and Copyright Law
8

Since 1909, copyright law—with only two exceptions, neither
of which is relevant here—has been written by a group of affected
9
industries. Chief among them is the content industry, but the
group also comprises the consumer electronics industry, the
computer industry, authors (to a limited extent), librarians, and
10
others. This pattern developed in the early years of the twentieth
century when attempts to revise the Copyright Act as it then stood
failed because one industry or another would hold the proposed
legislation hostage in order to secure new or different benefits for
11
itself. Eventually, Congress decided that the way to get copyright
legislation passed was to let the affected industries write it.
Copyright law is not unique in that it is heavily affected by
special interests. However, it may be unique in the degree of
influence that special interests have over it. It is literally the case
that Congress has for the most part delegated its lawmaking
12
authority to the content industry. This delegation has a number of
possible consequences, not the least of which is that it could justify
a bit less deference to legislation. Even a casual perusal of the
Copyright Act reveals a statute that reads less like public policy and
more like a very detailed contract made among numerous parties—
which, in a sense, it is.
Another consequence is that, because Congress has largely
abdicated its duty, the public is unrepresented in the making of
copyright law. Here, as elsewhere, if you’re not at the table, you
don’t get served. In the past, this was not especially troublesome,
because copyright was rarely enforced against a member of the
8. The exceptions are: (i) the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-517, sec. 10, § 117, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980), which revised § 117
upon the recommendation of the Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU), a committee of experts charged with
recommending copyright treatment of computer programs; and (ii) the Fairness
in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub.
L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, which limited the number of institutions required to
pay performance royalties for nondramatic musical works. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)
(2004).
9. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 23, 135-63 (2001).
10. Id. at 126.
11. Id. at 26.
12. Id.
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public. Today, however, headlines are full of copyright litigation
conducted against members of the public. In addition, what the
law hasn’t taken away is taken by the licenses to which we are
constantly asked to agree.
Finally, the making of law by industry suggests that perhaps the
last protector of the public interest in copyright—and let us not
forget that the public interest is the very reason for copyright—is the
Supreme Court. This, too, would counsel more scrutiny, and less
deference, by the Court.
The process by which copyright law is made suggests that
extreme deference by the Court might not be appropriate. But that
is not the only reason to be skeptical about the Court’s recent
decisions. The invalidation of at least one critical assumption
underlying copyright also supports an approach less deferential
than that adopted by the Court. Let us turn next to an examination
of that assumption.
B. Content Unbound
We have already noted that copyrights are being increasingly
enforced against the public. We might at this point ask, “why?” For
most of the last 100 years, members of the public rarely were
copyright defendants. What has changed? The answer is that for
most of the past, content was inextricably bound up with a tangible
container. This fact alone prevented a lot of conflict between the
public and the content industry.
Historically, the dominant business model for the content
industry was based on the distribution of content containers. For
members of the public, both reproduction and distribution of
analog containers were impractical, and this impracticality
functioned as an adjunct to copyright, limiting infringement by
practical, rather than legal, means. Reproduction of content
containers was inherently limited by the expense of reproducing
the containers, and by the degradation of analog copies.
Distribution of content containers was limited mainly by its cost;
large-scale distribution of physical goods is expensive. In other
words, in a world where access to content depends on
manufacturing and distributing physical containers, being a
content player required a large capital investment. Most citizens
couldn’t muster the investment, and wouldn’t care to if they could.
Thus, there was, in the main, peace between consumers and the
industry.
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All this changed with the introduction of digital technology,
which freed content from its container and thereby removed many
of the barriers of entry into the content business. The result has not
only been public competition, done without any profit motive
(such as Napster and KaZaa), but also the creation of new kinds of
publishing enterprises (such as Eric Eldred’s, based on digitizing
and distributing works in the public domain). The content
distribution channels have been radically reconfigured so that
today content can be distributed worldwide, twenty-four hours a
day, seven days a week, with little more than a high-speed Internet
connection.
Keeping this in mind, let us turn to the Supreme Court cases
that are our focus.
III. ELDRED V. ASHCROFT
A. Copyright Clause
The result of the aforementioned developments is that the
content industry has suddenly lost its former lock on control over
distribution channels. This has provoked industry responses aimed
at strengthening and extending the copyright monopoly to
reconsolidate control over content. The copyright term extension
was entirely consistent with this agenda. Like other copyright
legislation, it was a consensus product of the content industry.
Testimony before Congress was heavily dominated by industry
13
representatives. Almost no one spoke for the public interest.
13. See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 5 (1996):
The [Senate] Committee [on the Judiciary] held hearings on
September 20, 1995. Bruce A. Lehman . . . and Marybeth Peters . . .
testified on behalf of the Administration. The Committee also heard
testimony from Jack Valenti, president and chief executive officer,
Motion Picture Association of America; Alan Menken, composer,
lyricist, and representative of AmSong; Patrick Alger, president,
Nashville Songwriters Association; and Prof. Peter A. Jaszi, American
University, Washington College of Law. In addition, written statements
were received for the record from Senator Christopher J. Dodd, the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), the
National Music Publishing Association Inc. (NMPA), the Songwriters
Guild of America, the Graphic Artists Guild, the National Writers
Union, the Coalition of Creators and Copyright Owners, Author
Services Inc., the Midwest Travel Writers Association, Donaldson
Publishing Co., the American Library Association, the American Film
Heritage Association, the Society for Cinema Studies, Lawrence
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Naturally, as far as the record reveals, the industry representatives
spoke neither of consolidating control over distribution nor of
14
Mickey Mouse. Rather, great emphasis was laid on the European
Union’s recent commensurate extension of the copyright term,
and of United States copyright owners being disadvantaged in
15
Europe. That European copyright is not answerable to the
Constitution and is not thereby bound to serve the interest of the
public was evidently not considered important.
One of the striking things about the Eldred opinion is that it
conveys no sense of change in the copyright landscape. The Court
appears either unaware of, or uninterested in, the profound
changes that are reshaping the reproduction and distribution of
content. Rather, Eldred gives the impression that nothing at all is
new, and that one can comfortably rely on Congress to protect the
public interest in the matter of copyright, thereby converting the
issue into a rather minor disagreement about the proper length of
protection.
If one accepts that what is at stake is a mere question about
what length of copyright optimizes the creation and distribution of
new works, then Eldred’s approach is undoubtedly correct.
However, many do not accept that view and believe instead that the
Court’s deference to Congress seems unjustified. Were the Court to
recognize that copyright law is not the product of a reasoned
balance crafted by Congress, but rather the self-interested rentseeking of an industry threatened with obsolescence, it might well
have been willing to characterize the question as involving limits on
Technology, Bob Dylan Jr., Don Henley, Carlos Santana, Stephen
Sondheim, Mike Stoller, E. Randol Schoenberg, Ginny Mancini, Lisa
M. Brownlee, Prof. William Patry, and Prof. Dennis Karjala, writing on
behalf of 45 intellectual property law professors.
To similar effect, see H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 5 (1998):
The [House Judiciary] Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property held a hearing on the issue of copyright term
extension on June 27, 1997. Testimony was received from Fritz Attaway
representing the Motion Picture Association of America; George David
Weiss, representing the Songwriters Guild of America; Frances Preston,
representing Broadcast Music, Incorporated; and Professor Jerome
Reichman of Vanderbilt Law School.
14. Larry Lessig, among others, has attributed the CTEA largely to efforts by
the Walt Disney Co. to maintain copyright protection in effect for Mickey. See
Lawrence Lessig, How I Lost the Big One, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 57,
available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2004/story_lessig_
marapr04.html (last visited July 8, 2004).
15. H.R. REP. NO. 105-452 (1998); S. REP. NO. 104-315 (1996).
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congressional power rather than policies about term length. That
is, the question was not whether Congress or the Court can better
determine what is the optimal term of protection; rather, the
question was whether the Court should read the Constitution to
impose limits on congressional power to extend terms indefinitely.
The Court could have viewed the issue in Eldred as whether a term
that can be indefinitely extended is “limited.” Congress’s assertion
that it can extend existing terms as it chooses would then be
suspect as a question of congressional power, and not merely as a
question of policy. The Court’s unwillingness to confront this
directly is deeply troubling. After all, some might argue (as did
Sonny Bono) that the best policy would be to have unlimited
copyright terms. If all questions of term come down to mere
questions of policy, then the constitutional requirement of a
limited term is meaningless.
Unsurprisingly, the petitioner’s arguments in Eldred were
directed largely to the question of congressional power. In cases
16
dealing with federalism and the Commerce Clause, the Court has
opined that the Constitution must be interpreted in a way that is
consistent with limits on federal power. Surely, if this is true for the
Commerce Clause it is also true for the Copyright Clause. But the
Eldred majority did not even cite its earlier Commerce Clause cases,
despite petitioner’s written and oral argument relying largely on
17
them. If Congress (that is, the content industry) can simply
extend existing terms as it sees fit, where is the limited term
required by the Constitution? It should be quite apparent that this
question is not at all the same as asking what the optimal term
length is, but the Court addressed only the latter.
The Court also relied on history, but the weight of history in
Supreme Court analysis depends entirely on the context. The
Court has not hesitated to invalidate unconstitutional exercises of
congressional power, even those supported by histories far more
18
extensive than copyright and patent legislation. In INS v. Chadha,
for example, the Court invalidated “ ‘nearly 200 other statutory
19
provisions’ in which Congress had exercised a ‘legislative veto.’ ”

16. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17. See Lessig, supra note 14, at 57.
18. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
19. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 235 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (White, J. dissenting)).
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Clearly, Congress’s earlier unconstitutional exercise of legislative
power cannot immunize it against a properly framed challenge, yet
the Court chose to defer. It should be clear by now that the Court’s
deference was a choice, and not a necessity.
In short, I find it difficult to be as sanguine about the
copyright clause analysis in Eldred as is Professor Leaffer. To me,
the case demonstrates the Court’s willingness to continue to
indulge in fictions—that Congress legislates copyright with an eye
on the public interest; that the copyright landscape is
fundamentally unaltered—that will, if they continue, threaten the
progress of science that copyright is supposed to promote. The
sooner the Court can come to grips with copyright reality, the
better off progress—and society—will be. In the meantime, I hope
that Professor Leaffer’s prediction that this will be the last
20
extension of copyright turns out to be correct. His prediction that
21
further extensions would likely be upheld bodes ill because I
suspect the content industry will continue to press for expansion as
long as its ability to do so goes unchecked.
B. First Amendment
Likewise, I find little ground for optimism in Eldred’s First
Amendment treatment. Professor Leaffer notes that the Court
relied upon the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
doctrine to accommodate the First Amendment, and sees in that
22
reliance “real constraints on the scope of copyright law.” What I
see is a rhetorical device that the Court used to avoid more
meaningful analysis of the relationship between copyright and the
First Amendment.
To begin with, the Court’s—and indeed, copyright’s—reliance
on the idea/expression dichotomy as a bulwark of First
Amendment protection assumes an ability to distinguish between
idea and expression that is often, perhaps more often than not,
absent. To the extent this supposed dichotomy has meaning, it is
limited to ideas expressed in words, and even there, it can be
23
devilishly tricky to sort out what is idea from what is expression.
20. Marshall Leaffer, Life After Eldred: The Supreme Court and the Future of
Copyright, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1597, 1603 (2004).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1605.
23. See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 28-34 (New York
University Press 2001). Compare Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675
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And if we are talking about ideas expressed in other ways, such as
music or images, the idea/expression dichotomy is an exercise in
metaphysics that cannot be applied consistently. Notably, the Eldred
Court was indeed confronted with claims by persons wishing to
24
make use of musical works. It is little consolation to them that
their First Amendment rights are protected by the idea/expression
dichotomy.
Of course, one might object that for works as to which the
idea/expression dichotomy is inadequate, the fair use doctrine still
exists. Unfortunately for the likes of Eric Eldred, deciding whether
a particular use is fair is generally one of the last decisions made in
the course of copyright litigation. Therefore, anyone relying on the
fair use doctrine has to be willing to spend a great deal of money,
often upward of $100,000, to defend his or her right to speak. This
chilling effect would not be tolerated in most speech contexts, but
in copyright cases it seems not to concern the Court.
Now, I do agree with Professor Leaffer that Eldred leaves open
a First Amendment argument—specifically, that a particular
enactment “altered the traditional contours of copyright
25
protection,” which could necessitate “further First Amendment
26
scrutiny.” I, too, hope that this will someday lead to meaningful
First Amendment review of property claims in speech. But, I believe
such a review is unlikely, at least with the current composition of
the Court.
C. Copyright Maintenance
Where Professor Leaffer and I find our strongest agreement is
(1st Cir. 1967) (idea for sweepstakes instructions merged with expression,
therefore uncopyrightable) with Quality King Distrib. v. L’anza Research Int’l, 523
U.S. 135 (1998) (instructions for shampooing hair copyrightable).
24. United States Supreme Court Petitioner’s Brief at 3-4, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at 2002 WL 1041928.
Petitioners Luck’s Music Library, Inc. and Edwin F. Kalmus & Co., Inc.
specialize in selling and renting classical orchestral sheet music . . . .
Both sell to thousands of customers worldwide, including many
community and scholastic orchestras . . . . Both had made preparations
to release new sheet music for work that was to pass into the public
domain in 1998. This included the work of Bela Bartok, Maurice J.
Ravel, [and] Richard Strauss . . . . Those plans have been blocked for
20 years.
Id.
25. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 191.
26. Id.
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with his proposed solution to the problem of term extension,
namely the institution of a maintenance requirement for
copyrights extended beyond fifty years after the author’s death. For
my part, I would rather the petitioners in Eldred had won, but,
failing that, Professor Leaffer’s proposed solution would help
ameliorate the relentless expansion of copyright. A similar proposal
has been made in Congress, in a bill titled the Public Domain
27
Enhancement Act. Such a requirement would not only enhance
the public domain, but would also relieve some of the burden on
speech that copyright imposes. The vast majority of copyrighted
works have no economic life left fifty years after the author has
died; the Berne Convention, TRIPS, and NAFTA require no more
than life plus fifty years. So this step would, at least, not make
things worse.
While it is a worthy proposal, its chances of passing are slim to
none. After all, it is the content industry and not Congress that will
evaluate the proposal. And given that the bill offers nothing to the
industry, but simply takes away rights—even rights that have no
value—the industry will not support it. The track record for
copyright bills without content industry support leads me to
conclude, regretfully, that the new term is life plus seventy years,
and that the public domain will have to wait twenty more years to
see any growth. That is, unless Congress extends copyright again,
something that Professor Leaffer sees as unlikely but legal, and that
I see as likely and, given the Eldred decision, probably legal as well.
IV. TASINI V. NEW YORK TIMES
Tasini was another case reaffirming the Court’s view that when
it comes to copyright, nothing has changed. Professor Leaffer has
ably and accurately characterized the issues in the case, which
turned upon the meaning of the word “revision” in § 201(c) of the
Copyright Act, providing that unless expressly otherwise specified,
the
owner of copyright in [a] collective work is presumed to
have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and
distributing the contribution as part of that particular
collective work, any revision of that collective work, and
27. H.R. 2601, 108th Cong., (1st Sess. 2003). The bill is currently languishing
in the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet,
and
Intellectual
Property.
See
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d108:h.r.02601: (last visited July 8, 2004).
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any later collective work in the same series.
The defendant newspapers had authorized the inclusion of
plaintiffs’ contributions in electronic databases. The authors of the
articles sued. The case raised the question whether an electronic
database is a “revision” of a newspaper, so that the defendants had
sufficient rights to authorize the inclusion of plaintiff’s work in the
databases. The court held that electronic databases are not
privileged “revisions” of collective works.
Professor Leaffer argues that the outcome of Tasini is
problematic, while the Court’s reasoning is sound. I believe the
opposite is true. To me, the outcome of the case—a victory for
authors, and a defeat for publishers—is not only a good one, but,
28
given the “pro-author basis of § 201,” is probably the only
outcome the Court could have achieved without doing violence to
the Act and its legislative history. On the other hand, I find the
reasoning in Tasini to be sadly lacking.
Let us begin with the outcome. This is a case that authors won
against their publishers. As such it is quite rare, because in general
publishers will take, by their publishing contracts, nearly every
valuable right that the law gives the author. The alienability of
copyright is the only reason that publishers support giving rights to
authors; this much, at least, has not changed since the Statute of
29
Anne. So it is perhaps no surprise that even before Tasini was
decided, publishers had begun to demand express transfers of the
right to electronic reproduction and distribution. More surprising
was the reaction of the publisher defendants after the decision was
announced: Rather than bargaining with the authors in good faith,
30
as the Court had suggested the publishers might do, they removed
all material contributed by the authors, expunging it from
electronic databases. Surely this was not the Court’s fault: § 201(c)
was written with the protection of authors in mind, as the Court
31
recognized. That the publishers would exploit their market power
to extract the right of electronic publication from the authors is
not something that the Court can control. In short, I think the
Court reached the correct legal conclusion, notwithstanding the

28. Leaffer, supra note 20 at 1610.
29. 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
30. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505 (“The parties (Authors and Publishers) may enter
into an agreement allowing continued electronic reproduction of the Authors’
works . . . .”).
31. Id. at 496 n.3.
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publishers’ bad behavior following the decision.
The reasoning of Tasini, on the other hand, I find
troublesome. The case is far from media-neutral, in my view.
Instead, the Court’s reasoning focuses almost entirely on what the
32
electronic database presentation looks like to a user. But as it
turns out, the Court does not mean that the content of the sued-on
works must look different. According to the Court, the difference
that matters for copyright purposes is that the material extraneous
to the article—the material appearing on pages unconnected with
the article—is not reproduced and distributed when articles are
33
distributed electronically. In other words, the fact that you cannot
see what is on the surrounding pages is what makes the publishers’
actions infringing.
This triumph of container-centered reasoning deserves a
special mention. The Court implies that the separation of content
from container results in a new work. Certainly, as the publishers
argued, the articles themselves are identical to those published in
the newspapers. Proper attribution back to the newspaper was,
apparently, always given. That the articles were taken out of their
physical containers—and therefore the other content included in
those containers was no longer present—was enough to persuade
the Court that these presentations could not be “revisions” within
§ 201(c). Thus, the Court has effectively frozen § 201(c) in time,
limiting it to the technology that existed at the time it was drafted.
32. Id. at 500-02 & n.11.
33. To understand this, one must understand that:
GPO [General Periodicals Online, one of the infringing electronic
databases] contains articles from approximately 200 publications or
sections of publications. Unlike NEXIS and NYTO [New York Times
Online, another infringing database], GPO is an image-based, rather
than a text-based, system. The Times has licensed GPO to provide a
facsimile of the Times’ Sunday Book Review and Magazine. UMI
“burns” images of each page of these sections onto CD-ROMs. The CDROMs show each article exactly as it appeared on printed pages,
complete with photographs, captions, advertisements, and other
surrounding materials. UMI [University Microfilms International,
another defendant] provides an index and abstracts of all the articles
in GPO.
Tasini, 533 U.S. at 491. Further, “[i]n GPO, the article appears with the other
materials published on the same page or pages, but without any material
published on other pages of the original periodical.” Id. at 500. GPO was the most
inclusive database among those mentioned. Nevertheless, including images of the
entire pages on which the articles originally appeared was not enough. Missing
were the pages on which the article did not appear. A better example of containercentered copyright reasoning would be hard to find.
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Only container-centered technology, or complete reconstructions
of container-centered technology, will result in a privileged
“revision” of a collective work.
On the other hand, the publishers’ exploitation of the articles,
and their exclusion of the authors from participation in the profits
realized from that exploitation, is surely troubling. Is another
analysis possible, one that does not anchor the Copyright Act to the
technology of 1976? To begin, consider—as did the Court—how
users actually interact with the electronic databases in issue.
Generally, a user inputs a request for material, which is then
displayed on the computer screen. This is a critical event: an article
that can be summoned up for display by any member of the public
who has paid, or is willing to pay, a fee is a “public” display. As such,
it is a distinct form of exploitation of the article and, more to the
point, one that is not covered by the limited privilege given
publishers in § 201(c).
The Register of Copyrights made this argument to the Court
34
in an amicus brief. Here was an opportunity for the Court to take
a step into copyright reality: In electronic media, public display is
often what matters (and when it isn’t, public performance and
public distribution stand ready). But the Court, resting on the
status quo and assuming that content must be bound to a container
(else it is a “new work”), decided not to address the Register’s
argument. Instead, the Court decided the case on the ground that
the absence of the surrounding content—which, from the user’s
perspective, is merely surplusage—determines that the work is not
a “revision.”
V. DASTAR CORP. V. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP.
Finally, we come to Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
35
Corp., and I am happy to say that at least with respect to this case,
Professor Leaffer and I agree compl—well, almost completely.
Dastar raised the question whether, after a work has passed into the
public domain, later users must continue to credit the author of
the work. Nothing in the Copyright Act requires such a result, and
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, held that nothing in
the Lanham Act does, either.
The significance of Dastar is that what it means for a work to be
34. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 498 n.8.
35. 539 U.S. 23, 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003).
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in the public domain remains unchanged. The United States has
not historically recognized the moral right of attribution (or
“paternity”), and Justice Scalia’s opinion makes it clear that the
Lanham Act is not the proper basis for such a right. To require
attribution of works in the public domain would create a copyrightlike right outside of the Copyright Act. Recognizing that purchasers
of communicative products such as books and videos probably care
more about the author of the content than they do about the
36
producer of the physical item, the Court nevertheless held that
requiring attribution of works under the Lanham Act would
37
conflict impermissibly with the Copyright Act.
In so holding, the Court nearly (but not quite) implies that the
Commerce Clause power cannot be exercised in a way that conflicts
with the Copyright Clause. Justice Scalia says “[t]o hold [that the
Lanham Act requires attribution] would be akin to finding that §
43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which
38
Congress may not do.” That is, Congress cannot do under the
Lanham Act (based on the Commerce Clause) what it may not do
under the Copyright Act. This is, of course, not the same as
deciding the case on constitutional grounds, but we public domain
advocates must settle for the crumbs we can get these days.
Professor Leaffer is very likely correct when he points out that
the Court’s reading of the Lanham Act puts the United States out
39
of compliance with its Berne Convention obligations. Article 6bis
of Berne requires signatory nations to grant authors the right to
claim authorship of their work. After Dastar, however, it seems that
in the United States no right of attribution exists once the work has
passed into the public domain (at least for works not within the

36. Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2047-48.
37. Id. at 2048.
38. Id. at 2050.
39. It isn’t actually clear that the Berne Convention requires works in the
public domain to be attributed to their authors. The language of the treaty
addressing duration says merely, “The rights granted to the author . . . shall, after
his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights.” Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, art.
6bis, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27. In this case, the author was corporate and “death”
had no copyright significance. Perhaps, then, when the work has fallen into the
public domain, the economic rights have expired and therefore the Berne
Convention has nothing to say about attribution. Of course, it remains true that
United States copyright law provides no right of attribution even during the work’s
economic life, but this has been so for as long as the United States has had a
copyright law and is not the result of the Dastar decision.
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40

narrow classification of “works of visual art” ). The Berne
Convention compliance problem is a thorny one, but the Court is
right not to interpret the Lanham Act with a view to ensuring
compliance with Berne. Still, it is interesting that the Court was
willing in this case to overlook international (Berne) issues, while
in Eldred, the supposed “harmonization” with Europe provided part
41
of the rational basis for Congress’s action in extending copyright.
Like Professor Leaffer, I am not convinced that Dastar signals
the Court’s views on whether legislation based on the Commerce
Clause is permitted even when it would conflict with the Copyright
Clause. To me, the most reassuring thing about Dastar is that the
Court declined to create new copyright-like rights in public domain
works. Given the trend of the Court’s recent cases, that is perhaps
something for which one should be properly grateful.
VI. CONCLUSION
I find little with which to be pleased in the Court’s recent
copyright cases. The Court seems to be fighting a holding action,
fending off the future by resolutely gazing backward. While the
Court has not itself enlarged copyright, it has not meaningfully
evaluated Congress’s power to do so, and its decisions freeze
copyright into a moment in time long past. Until copyright law
recognizes that content is no longer container-bound, it will
continue to flounder, desperately seeking analogies to the past and
missing the significance of the technological changes all around us.
That said, I agree with Professor Leaffer that the future is not
black but gray. I believe that there is still much that can be done
about the expansion of copyright and its increasing concentration
into the hands of a media oligopoly, beginning with an awakening
of public concern with those vital rights that are eroded as
copyright expands. As long as that can happen, there is hope.
Sadly, if that does not happen, then I don’t think either Congress
or the Court will save us from ourselves.

40. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
41. The harmonization accomplished by the CTEA is more apparent than
real; United States copyright law is dramatically different in many important
respects from its European counterparts, and the CTEA did little to change that,
even with respect to the duration of copyright. See United States Supreme Court
Petitioner’s Brief at 42-43, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618),
available at 2002 WL 1041928.
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